HIBE with Polynomially Many Levels
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Abstract—We present the first hierarchical identity based encryption (HIBE) system that has full security for more than a constant number of levels. In all prior HIBE systems in the literature, the security reductions suffered from exponential degradation in the depth of the hierarchy, so these systems were only proven fully secure for identity hierarchies of constant depth. (For deep hierarchies, previous work could only prove the weaker notion of selective-ID security.) In contrast, we offer a tight proof of security, regardless of the number of levels; hence our system is secure for polynomially many levels.

Our result can very roughly be viewed as an application of Boyen’s framework for constructing HIBE systems from exponent-inversion IBE systems to a (dramatically souped-up) version of Gentry’s IBE system, which has a tight reduction. In more detail, we first describe a generic transformation from “identity based broadcast encryption with key randomization” (KR-IBBE) to a HIBE, and then construct KR-IBBE by modifying a recent construction of IBBE of Gentry and Waters, which is itself an extension of Gentry’s IBE system. Our hardness assumption is similar to that underlying Gentry’s IBE system.

I. INTRODUCTION

Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) is a public-key encryption scheme where one’s public key can be freely set to any value (such as one’s identity): An authority that holds a master secret key can take any arbitrary identifier and extract a secret key corresponding to this identifier. Anyone can then encrypt messages using the identifier as a public encryption key, and only the holder of the corresponding secret key can decrypt these messages. This concept was introduced by Shamir [19], a partial solution was proposed by Maurer and Yacobi [18], and the first fully functional IBE systems were described by Boneh and Franklin [5] and Cocks [11].

IBE systems can greatly simplify the public-key infrastructure for encryption solutions, but they are still not as general as one would like. Many organizations have an hierarchical structure, perhaps with one central authority, several sub-authorities and sub-sub-authorities and many individual users, each belonging to a small part of the organization tree. We would like to have a solution where each authority can delegate keys to its sub-authorities, who in turn can keep delegating keys further down the hierarchy to the users. The depth of the hierarchy can range from two or three in small organizations, up to ten or more in large ones. An IBE system that allows delegation as above is called Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE). In HIBE, messages are encrypted for identity-vectors, representing nodes in the identity hierarchy. This concept was introduced by Horwitz and Lynn [17], who also described a partial solution to it, and the first fully functional HIBE system was described by Gentry and Silverberg [15].

The security model for IBE and HIBE systems postulates an attacker that can adaptively make “key-reveal” queries, thereby revealing the decryption keys of identities of its choice. The required security property asserts that such an attacker still cannot break the encryption at any identity other than those for which it issued key-reveal queries. (Or in the case of HIBE, other than those for which it issued key-reveal queries or their descendants.)

For the first IBE and HIBE systems, the only known proofs of security are carried out in the random-oracle model. Canetti et al. [9] introduced a weaker notion of security called selective-ID, where the attacker must choose the identity to attack before the system parameters are chosen (but can still make adaptive key-reveal queries afterward). They proved that a variant of the Gentry-Silverberg system is secure in this model even without random oracles. Boneh and Boyen described a more efficient selective-ID IBE [1], and later described a fully secure IBE system without a random oracle [2]. Waters [22] described what is currently the most practical adaptively-secure HIBE system without random oracles.

All currently known fully-secure HIBE systems, however, suffer from loose security reductions (whether they use random oracles or not). Specifically, they lose a multiplicative factor of \( \Omega(q/\ell) \) in the success probability, where \( q \) is the number of key-reveal queries and \( \ell \) is the depth of the identity hierarchy. This means that asymptotically these reductions can only be used for hierarchies of constant depth. When considering concrete parameters, these reductions are only meaningful for hierarchies of depth two or three.

Gentry [13] proposed the first adaptively-secure IBE system without random oracles that has a tight reduction to its underlying hard problem. Recently Gentry and Waters extended Gentry’s IBE to construct an adaptively-secure identity based broadcast encryption (IBBE) system without random oracles [16], whose security is tightly based on a related hard problem. Our HIBE system builds on the Gentry-Waters system.

Boyen [8] proposed a framework for constructing HIBE systems from exponent-inversion IBE systems. Specifically, Boyen described some properties of pairing-based IBE systems (called parallel IBE and linear IBE), and proved that an IBE system with these properties can be transformed to HIBE with comparable security. Boyen noted that Gentry’s IBE does not quite fit within this template, and left it as an open problem to construct a HIBE system from Gentry’s IBE system. Our system, which solves this problem, does not quite fit within Boyen’s framework, yet our approach owes much to Boyen’s...
idea.

We construct the first fully-secure HIBE with a tight proof of security. Namely, ours is the first HIBE system that can be proven fully secure for more than a small constant number of levels. This solves an open problem posed in [15], [1], [2], [22], [3], [13], [8]. Similarly to the systems of Gentry [13] and Gentry-Waters [16], we exhibit a tight reduction, albeit to a problem whose instances are of size linear in $q + \ell$.

A. Loose and Tight Reductions

On a high level, the reason that most IBE systems have loose reductions is that those reductions involve the following trade-off: For each identity ID, either the simulator knows a decryption key for ID, or it doesn’t. If it knows a key for ID then it does not learn anything new if the adversary chooses ID as the target identity to attack, since it could have used the decryption key to learn the same information. And if the simulator does not know a decryption key for ID then it must abort if the adversary makes a key-reveal query for this identity.

The crucial difference in the security proof of Gentry’s IBE [13] is that there are many different decryption keys for each identity, and the simulator knows a small subset of these keys. Thus, the simulator can answer every key-reveal query without aborting, but still learn something when the adversary chooses that identity for the challenge ciphertext. In this sense, Gentry’s IBE system follows the universal hash proof paradigm of Cramer and Shoup [12]: Given a well-formed ciphertext, all the decryption keys recover the same message, but they recover different messages when the ciphertext is mal-formed (in a certain sense). The adversary is assumed to have a non-negligible advantage when the challenge ciphertext is well-formed, but has essentially no advantage (statistically) when it is mal-formed; the adversary’s different behavior in these cases allows the simulator to solve the underlying decision problem. Gentry’s reduction uses an underlying hard problem that has a large problem instance (size $\theta(q)$), to ensure that the adversary cannot use its $q$ key-reveal queries to determine what keys the simulator possesses for the target identity. In this work we extend Gentry’s IBE system and proof to the case of a HIBE.

B. Constructing HIBE, Step 1: From IBBE to HIBE

In our quest to construct HIBE, we use as an intermediate step a specific type of identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE). An IBBE system can be seen as nowhere in between regular IBE and HIBE: It allows a sender to encrypt a message to a set identities, and each member of this set can use its own key to decrypt the message. This is somewhat similar to HIBE, in that encryption is targeted at a group of identities (similarly to the identity vector in HIBE). However, IBBE is simpler than HIBE since decryption keys correspond only to single identities (see Section II-B).

As a first step in constructing HIBE systems, we provide a generic transformation from IBBE to HIBE. This transformation, however, requires an “augmented IBBE system” that also has decryption keys corresponding to sets of identities (for decrypting ciphertexts that were encrypted for these sets). Specifically, we require a key-randomizable identity based broadcast encryption (KR-IBBE), where it is possible to generate a uniformly random decryption key $K_S$ for a set of identities $S$ from any decryption key $K_{S'}$ for $S' \subset S$ (see Section II-C). KR-IBBE is rather close to HIBE, but a major difference is that security is defined with respect to an adversary that can only ask for decryption keys corresponding to single identities, not for sets of identities. Hence it is still simpler to design KR-IBBE and use our transformation than to design a HIBE “from scratch.”

C. Constructing HIBE, Step 2: Constructing KR-IBBE

Even with the simplification of KR-IBBE, our construction and its proof are still rather complex. Part of the reason for the complexity of our system and proof stems from the inherent tension between the key-randomization requirement and the Cramer-Shoup proof paradigm: On one hand, key-randomization implies in particular that one can generate a random decryption key for an identity set $S$ from any fixed valid encryption key for the same set. On the other hand, the Cramer-Shoup paradigm require that the simulator be able to generate only a small subset of the decryption keys for the target identity set.

Our proof resolves this tension by going through an intermediate step in which we replace the full-randomization requirement with “pseudo-randomization”: Namely, from each fixed valid encryption key we can only generate a small subset of the decryption keys, but this small subset still looks random. In our case, the difference between “fully-random” and “pseudo-random” keys is that “fully random” keys are taken from some linear space and “pseudo-random” keys are taken from a proper subspace of this linear space. These being linear spaces of group elements, they are indistinguishable under the Decision Linear Assumption [4].

We prove the security of the “pseudo-random” system using techniques and hard problems analogous to those used by Gentry and Waters in [16], but we need to make rather substantial modifications to the system given in [16]. Most notably, the randomization requirement seems to imply that we cannot have scalars in the decryption key, so we must convert everything into vectors of group elements.

II. HIBE AND IBBE: DEFINITIONS

For simplicity, we define our encryption systems as key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM). The standard transformation from KEM to encryption is ignored here.

A. Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption

A HIBE system consists of the following five procedures:

- $\text{Setup}(\lambda, \ell)$ Takes as input a security parameter $\lambda$ and the hierarchy depth $\ell$. It outputs a public key $PK$ and a master secret key $SK$. The public key implies also a key space $K(PK)$ and an identity space $TD(PK)$, and hierarchical identities are (ordered) tuples in $TD(PK) \times \ell$.
- $\text{KeyGen}(PK, SK, ID)$ Takes as input the public key $PK$ and master secret key $SK$, and an identity vector $ID$ =
\[ I_1, \ldots, I_t \in TD(PK) \leq \ell. \] It outputs a decryption key \( K_{ID} \) for \( I_\text{ID} \).

- **KeyDerive\((PK, I_\text{ID}, K_{I_\text{ID}}, I_\text{ID}')\)** takes as input the public key \( PK \), the identity vector \( I_\text{ID} \) and corresponding decryption key \( K_{I_\text{ID}} \), and another vector \( I_\text{ID}' \) such that \( I_\text{ID} \) is a prefix of \( I_\text{ID}' \). It outputs a decryption key \( K_{I_\text{ID}} \) for \( I_\text{ID}' \).

- **KEM\((PK, I_\text{ID})\)** takes as input the public key \( PK \) and identity vector \( I_\text{ID} \). It outputs a pair \((K, C)\), where \( K \) is the KEM key (from the key space \( K(PK) \)) and \( C \) is the ciphertext.

- **Decrypt\((PK, C, I_\text{ID}, K_{I_\text{ID}})\)** on input the public key \( PK \), ciphertext \( C \), identity vector \( I_\text{ID} \) and corresponding decryption key \( K_{I_\text{ID}} \). It outputs the corresponding KEM key \( K \) (or an error message \( \bot \)).

We require the usual “completeness”, namely that decryption with the correct decryption key always recovers the correct KEM key. In particular, setting \((PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda, \ell)\) and fixing any chain of identity vectors \( I_\text{ID}_1, I_\text{ID}_2, \ldots, I_\text{ID}_t \) with each \( I_\text{ID}_i \) a prefix of \( I_\text{ID}_{i+1} \), if we set \( K_{I_\text{ID}_i} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(PK, SK, I_\text{ID}_i) \) and then \( K_{I_\text{ID}_i} \leftarrow \text{KeyDerive}(PK, I_\text{ID}_{i-1}, K_{I_\text{ID}_{i-1}}, I_\text{ID}_i) \) for \( i = 2, \ldots, t \) and \((K, C) \leftarrow \text{KEM}(PK, I_\text{ID}_t)\), then we have \( \text{Decrypt}(PK, C, I_\text{ID}_t, K_{I_\text{ID}_t}) = K \) (with probability one).

**Security**: Chosen-plaintext security for a HIBE system \( \mathcal{E} \) against an adversary \( A \) is defined by the following game between \( A \) and a “challenger” (both given the parameters \( \lambda, \ell \) as input):

- **Setup**: The challenger runs \((PK, SK) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{Setup}(\lambda, \ell)\) and gives \( PK \) to \( A \).

- **Key-Reveal**: The adversary \( A \) makes adaptive key-reveal queries to the challenger, each consisting of an identity vector \( I_\text{ID} = [I_1, \ldots, I_t] \in TD(PK) \leq \ell \). If the adversary already made the challenge query and \( I_\text{ID} \) is a prefix of the target identity \( I_\text{ID}' \) then the challenger ignores this query, and otherwise it returns to the adversary the decryption key \( K_{I_\text{ID}} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{KeyGen}(PK, SK, I_\text{ID}) \).

- **Challenge**: The adversary queries the challenger with the target identity vector \( I_\text{ID}' = [I_1, \ldots, I_t'] \in TD(PK) \leq \ell \). If the adversary already made a challenge query before, or if it made a key-reveal query for any prefix of the target identity \( I_\text{ID}' \) then the challenger ignores this query. Otherwise the challenger sets \((K_1, C) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{KEM}(PK, I_\text{ID}')\), chooses another random key \( K_0 \in_R K(PK) \) and a “challenge bit” \( \sigma \in_R \{0, 1\} \), and returns \((K_\sigma, C)\) to the adversary.

The adversary can make many Key-Reveal queries and one Challenge query, in whatever order. Then it halts, outputting a guess \( \sigma' \) for the challenge bit \( \sigma \). The HIBE advantage of \( A \) is

\[
\text{AdvHIBE}_A(\lambda, \ell) = \Pr[A \Rightarrow 1|\sigma = 1] - \Pr[A \Rightarrow 1|\sigma = 0]
\]

**Definition 1 (CPA-secure HIBE)**: The system \( \mathcal{E} \) is CPA-secure if for any efficient adversary \( A \) and any \( \ell = \text{poly}(\lambda) \) it holds that \( \text{AdvHIBE}_A(\lambda, \ell(\lambda)) \) is negligible in \( \lambda \).

CCA-security is defined similarly, where the adversary can also make decryption queries (except for decrypting the target ciphertext by the target identity vector).

### B. Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption

An IBBE system consists of the procedures \((\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{KEM}, \text{Decrypt})\). \( \text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \) and \( \text{KEM} \) are similar to HIBE, except that \( \text{KeyGen} \) can only be used for single identities (not identity vectors), and \( \text{KEM} \) gets a set of identities \( S \) instead of an ordered vector. Decrypt is defined as follows:

- **Decrypt\((PK, C, S, I_\text{ID}, K_{ID})\)** on input the public key \( PK \), ciphertext \( C \), identity set \( S = \{I_1, \ldots, I_t\} \) (with \( t \leq \ell \)) and the decryption key \( K_{I_\text{ID}} \) for some \( I_\text{ID} \in S \). It outputs the corresponding KEM key \( K \) (or an error message \( \bot \)).

The security definition for IBBE is similar to the one for HIBE, the difference being that the adversary can only make key-reveal queries for single identities rather than identity-vectors. See the long version [14] for the formal definitions.

### C. Key-Randomizable IBBE

To construct HIBE systems, we will use “augmented IBBE systems” that also have decryption keys corresponding to sets of identities: A decryption key corresponding to an identity-set \( S \) makes it possible to decrypt ciphertexts that were created with respect to this set. A Key-Randomizable Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption system (KR-IBBE) is an IBBE system with extended key generation \( \text{KeyGen}^* \), extended decryption \( \text{Decrypt}^* \), and key-derivation \( \text{KeyDerive} \), as follows:

- **KeyGen\(^*(PK, SK, S)\)** takes as input the public key \( PK \), master secret key \( SK \), and an identity set \( S = \{I_1, \ldots, I_t\} \in TD(PK) \leq \ell \), and outputs a decryption key \( K_S \) for \( S \). We require that \( \text{KeyGen}^*(PK, SK, S) \) degenerates to the original \( \text{KeyGen} \) when \( S \) is a singleton set \( S = \{I\} \).

- **KeyDerive\((PK, S, K_S, S')\)** takes as input the public key \( PK \), an identity set \( S \) and corresponding decryption key \( K_S \), and a superset \( S' \supseteq S \), and outputs a decryption key \( K_{S'} \) for \( S' \).

- **Decrypt\(^*(PK, C, S, K_S)\)** takes as input the public key \( PK \), an identity set \( S \), ciphertext \( C \) that was generated with respect to \( S \), and the decryption key \( K_S \) for \( S \). It outputs the KEM key \( K \) (or an error message \( \bot \)).

We stress that we make no security requirements regarding these additional procedures: the CPA-security game is still defined with respect to the original four procedures \((\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{KEM}, \text{Decrypt})\). However, we do make some functionality requirements, specifically the standard “completeness” requirement on Decrypt\(^*\) and a distribution requirement on KeyDerive.

The “completeness” requirement says that for any \((PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda, \ell)\) and any set of identities \( S \), if we set \( K_S \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^*(PK, SK, S) \) and \((K, C) \leftarrow \text{KEM}(PK, S)\), then we get \( \text{Decrypt}^*(PK, C, S, K_S) = K \) (with probability one).
The distribution requirement says for any \((PK, SK) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda, \ell)\), any two sets of identities \(S \subseteq S'\), and any decryption key \(K_S \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}^*\(PK, SK, S\)\), the output distributions of \(\text{KeyGen}^*\(PK, SK, S'\)\) and \(\text{KeyDerive}\(PK, S, K_S, S'\)\) are almost identical. (That is, their statistical distance is negligible in \(\lambda\).)

**Remark.** Due to the distribution requirement above, our transformation from key-randomizable IBBE to HIBE in Section III results in a system where the decryption keys generated by \(\text{KeyDerive}\) have the same distribution as the ones generated by \(\text{KeyGen}\). As we pointed out before, this property allows us to ignore the delegation issue of Shi and Waters [20].

### III. From Key-Randomizable IBBE to HIBE

The transformation from key-randomizable IBBE to HIBE is quite straightforward: we use collision-resistant hashing to map identity-vectors to identity-sets, and then just use each of the procedures \(\text{Setup}\), \(\text{KeyGen}^*\), \(\text{KeyDerive}\), \(\text{KEM}\), \(\text{Decrypt}^*\) as-is. The only non-trivial aspect of this transformation is the security reduction, since the HIBE adversary can make key-reveal queries on identity-vectors whereas the IBBE adversary can only ask for keys of “top level” single identities. We handle this difference by having the reduction algorithm generate decryption keys differently than is done in the system, which is where we need the distribution requirement of key randomization.

#### A. The Transformation

Let \(\mathcal{E} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}^*, \text{KeyDerive}, \text{KEM}, \text{Decrypt}^*)\) be a key-randomizable IBBE system, and we assume that we have a “matching” collision resistant hash function \(H\) that can hash identity-vectors into the identity space of \(\mathcal{E}\). We use \(H\) to hash identity vectors in the HIBE system into identity sets for \(\mathcal{E}\) by setting:

\[
\hat{H}(ID_1, \ldots, ID_i) \triangleq \{H(ID_1), \ldots, H(ID_1, ID_2, \ldots, ID_i)\}
\]

Note that short of finding collisions in \(H\), we can only get \(H(ID_1, ID_2, \ldots, ID_i) \in \hat{H}(ID_i')\) if \((ID_1, ID_2, \ldots, ID_i)\) is a prefix of \(ID_i\). Then we construct a HIBE system as follows:

**HIBE.Setup(\(\lambda, \ell\)):** Set \((SK_0, PK_0) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{Setup}(\lambda, \ell)\). Output \(SK\) and \(PK\), which are the same as \(SK_0\) and \(PK_0\), except that each includes a description of the hash function \(H\) as above.

**HIBE.KeyGen(\(PK, SK, ID\)):** Set \(S \leftarrow \hat{H}(ID)\) (as above), \(K_S \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{KeyGen}^*(PK_0, SK_0, S)\) and output \(K_{ID} = K_S\).

**HIBE.KeyDerive(\(PK, ID, ID_i, ID_i':\)):** Set \(S \leftarrow \hat{H}(ID_i)\) and \(S' \leftarrow \hat{H}(ID_i')\), and note that \(S \subseteq S'\) since \(ID\) is a prefix of \(ID_i\). Also let \(K_S = K_{ID}\), compute \(K_{ID} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{KeyDerive}(PK_0, S, K_S, S')\) and output \(K_{ID} = K_S\).

**HIBE.KEM(\(PK, SK\)):** Set \(S \leftarrow \hat{H}(ID)\), compute \((K, C) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{KEM}(PK_0, S)\) and output \((K, C)\).

**HIBE.Decrypt(\(PK, C, ID, K_{ID}\)):** Set \(S \leftarrow \hat{H}(ID)\) and \(K_S = K_{ID}\), and return \(\mathcal{E}.\text{Decrypt}^*(PK_0, C, S, K_S)\).

**Theorem 1:** Suppose that there exists a HIBE adversary \(A\) that breaks CPA security (resp. CCA security) of the HIBE construction with advantage \(\epsilon\). Then, there exists an IBBE adversary \(B\) and a collision finder \(B'\), both running in about the same time as \(A\), such that \(B'\) finds a hash function collision with some probability \(\epsilon'\) and \(B\) breaks the CPA security (resp. CCA security) of the underlying KR-IBBE system \(\mathcal{E}\) with advantage \(\epsilon - \epsilon'\).

The proof is in the long version [14]. The only non-trivial aspect of the proof is that to get a key for the set \(S \leftarrow \hat{H}(ID_1, \ldots, ID_i)\), the simulator makes a query for the singleton key of the identity \(ID_i' = H(ID_1, \ldots, ID_i) \in S\), and then uses key-derivation to get the key for \(S\).

### IV. Notations and Preliminaries

We now introduce notations and hardness assumption that are used to establish our key-randomizable IBBE in Section V. We denote the set of integers from \(m\) to \(n\) (inclusive) by \([m, n]\). We denote polynomials by uppercase letters in Sans-serif font, for example \(P, Q, T, E\). We use the following simple fact about polynomials:

**Lemma 1:** For any polynomial \(P(x)\) and any scalar \(a\), \(P(x) - P(a)\) is divisible by \(x - a\). In other words, \(P(x) = P(a)\) is a polynomial (without denominator) of degree \(\deg(P) - 1\).

#### A. Bilinear maps and our additive notations

Our system and its security proof make heavy use of linear algebra. We therefore use additive notations for all the groups that are involved in the system. Specifically, we use \(\mathbb{Z}_q\) — the field of integers modulo a prime \(q\) — as our base scalar field, and we have two order-\(q\) groups that we call the source group \(\mathbb{G}\) and target group \(\mathbb{G}_T\), both of which can be viewed as vector spaces over \(\mathbb{Z}_q\).

Throughout the writeup we denote elements of the source group with a hat over lowercase letters (e.g., \(\hat{a}, \hat{b}\), etc.) and elements of the target group with a tilde (\(\tilde{a}, \tilde{b}\), etc.). Scalars will be denoted with no decorations (e.g., \(a, b\), and sometimes also \(\tau, \rho\), etc.)

We will make use of an efficiently computable bilinear map from the source group to the target group \(e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T\), such that for any two source-group elements \(\hat{a}, \hat{b} \in \mathbb{G}\) and any two scalars \(u, v \in \mathbb{Z}_q\) it holds that

\[ e(u \cdot \hat{a}, v \cdot \hat{b}) = u + v \cdot e(\hat{a}, \hat{b}) \]

The neutral elements in the groups \(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T\) are denoted by \(\hat{0}, \tilde{0}\), respectively. We also denote by \(\hat{1}\) some fixed generator in \(\mathbb{G}\), which we consider to be part of the description of \(\mathbb{G}\). We require that the mapping \(e\) is non-trivial, which means that \(e(1, \hat{1})\) is a generator in \(\mathbb{G}_T\), and we denote this generator by \(\hat{1} = e(1, \hat{1})\).

More generally, for a scalar \(a \in \mathbb{Z}_q\), we denote the source-group element \(\hat{a} \cdot \hat{1}\) by \(\hat{a}\), and the target-group element \(\hat{a} \cdot \tilde{1} = e(\hat{a}, \tilde{1})\) by \(\tilde{a}\). Conversely, for an element \(\hat{a} \in \mathbb{G}\), its discrete-logarithm based \(\hat{1}\) is denoted \(a \in \mathbb{Z}_q\). (Readers who are used to multiplicative notations may find it easier to think of \(\hat{a}, \tilde{a}\) as denoting “\(a\) in the exponent” in the appropriate groups.)
Note also that in these notations, the discrete-logarithm of \( \hat{a} \) with respect to \( \hat{b} \) is just their “ratio” \( \hat{a}/\hat{b} \), which is a scalar.

With these notations, we usually omit the map \( e \) altogether, and simply denote it as a “product” of two source-group elements:
\[
\hat{a} \cdot \hat{b} \overset{\text{def}}{=} e(\hat{a}, \hat{b}) = \hat{a}\hat{b} \in \mathbb{G}_T
\]

Note that the bi-linearity of \( e \) looks in these notations just like the natural commutativity property of products \( \hat{ua} \cdot \hat{vb} = \hat{uv} \cdot \hat{ab} \).

Below we slightly abuse notations to denote “powers of group elements”: If \( \hat{a} \) is a group element with discrete-logarithm \( a \), then we denote \( \hat{a}^i \overset{\text{def}}{=} a^i \cdot \hat{1} \) and we call \( \hat{a}^i \) the \( i \)’th power of \( \hat{a} \).

Vectors and matrices. We extend our notations to vectors and matrices: A vector of scalars is denoted with no decoration \( \hat{a} = [a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n] \), a vector of source-group elements denoted with a hat \( \hat{a} = [\hat{a}_1, \hat{a}_2, \ldots, \hat{a}_n] \), and a vector of target-group elements denoted with a tilde \( \tilde{a} = [\tilde{a}_1, \tilde{a}_2, \ldots, \tilde{a}_n] \). All these vectors are considered row vectors.

Matrices are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., \( A \) for a matrix of scalars, \( A \) for a matrix of source-group elements, and \( \hat{A} \) for a matrix of target-group elements. We denote the \( i \)’th row of \( A \) by \( A_i \), the sub-matrix consisting of rows \( i, j, k \) by \( A_{i,j,k} \), and the sub-matrix consisting of rows \( i \) through \( j \) is denoted \( A_{i,j} \). As usual, the transposed matrix of \( A \) is denoted \( A^t \).

We denote by \( \text{span}(\vec{x}, \vec{y}, \vec{z}) \) the linear space that is spanned by the vectors \( \vec{x}, \vec{y}, \vec{z} \), and also use the same notation to denote the uniform distribution over this space. For example, we use \( \vec{a} \leftarrow \vec{u} + \text{span}(A_{1,2,4}) \) as a shorthand for the process of choosing three random scalars \( a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) and setting \( \vec{u} \leftarrow \vec{u} + a A_1 + b A_2 + c A_4 \).

Inner and outer-products. For vectors \( \vec{a}, \vec{b} \), we denote their inner product by \( \langle \vec{a}, \vec{b} \rangle \overset{\text{def}}{=} \sum_i a_i b_i \). We use the same inner-product notations also for vectors of source-group elements, namely:
\[
\langle \vec{a}, \vec{b} \rangle = \langle \hat{a}, \hat{b} \rangle \overset{\text{def}}{=} \sum_i a_i b_i = \langle \hat{a}, \hat{b} \rangle \cdot \hat{1}, \quad \text{and} \quad \langle \vec{a}, \vec{b} \rangle \overset{\text{def}}{=} \sum_i e(\vec{a}_i, \vec{b}_i) = \langle \hat{a}, \hat{b} \rangle \cdot \hat{1}
\]

It is easy to check that all the commutative, associative, and distributive properties of inner products hold for both scalars and group elements.

Similar notations apply to matrix multiplication, for either scalar matrices or group-element matrices. For example, if \( A \) is an \( \ell \times m \) scalar matrix and \( \hat{B} \) is an \( m \times n \) matrix of source-group elements, then \( A \hat{B} \in \mathbb{G}[\ell \times n] \) is a matrix of source-group elements whose \( i, j \) element is the inner product of the \( i \)’th row of \( A \) by the \( j \)’th column of \( \hat{B} \). We also use \( \hat{a} \cdot \hat{b} \) to denote the outer product of two vectors. Namely, the outer product of the \( m \)-vector \( \vec{a} \) by the \( n \)-vector \( \vec{b} \) is the \( m \times n \) matrix obtained as the matrix product of the \( m \times 1 \) matrix \( \vec{a}^t \) by the \( 1 \times n \) matrix \( \hat{b} \). The same notation applies to vectors of group elements.

B. The BDHE-Set assumption

The BDHE-Set assumption (used also in [16]) is a parameterized generalization of the \( t \)-BDHI problem from [1].

Recall that a \( t \)-BDHI adversary is given \( t + 1 \) powers of a random source-group element, \( 1, \hat{a}, \hat{a}^2, \ldots, \hat{a}^t \), and it needs to distinguish the target-group element \( \hat{a}^{-1} \) from random.

An instance of the BDHE-Set assumption is parameterized by a set of integers \( S \subseteq \mathbb{Z} \) and another “target integer” \( m \).

The BDHE-Set adversary is given some powers of a random source-group element, \( \{\hat{a}^i : i \in S\} \), and it (roughly) needs to distinguish the target-group element \( \hat{a}^{-m} \) from random.

Denoting \( S + q \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{i + j \mod \lambda(q) : i, j \in S\} \), where \( \lambda(q) \) is the order of elements modulo \( q \), it is easy to see that if \( \mathbb{G} \) is an order-\( q \) bilinear-map group and \( m \in S + q \) then the problem is easy: Just choose some \( i, j \in S \) such that \( i + j = m \mod \lambda(q) \) and compute the bilinear map
\[
e(\hat{a}^i, \hat{a}^j) = \hat{a}^i \cdot \hat{a}^j = \hat{a}^{i+j} = \hat{a}^m
\]

However, when \( m \not\in S + q \) then there does not seem to be an easy way of distinguishing \( \hat{a}^m \) from random given the source-group elements \( \{\hat{a}^i : i \in S\} \). The formal BDHE-Set assumption below is somewhat stronger, however, giving the adversary not the target group element \( \hat{a}^m \) itself, but rather two random source group elements whose product is \( \hat{a}^m \). Even so, this may be a reasonable assumption to make.

Definition 2 (Decision BDHE-Set): Fix a prime number \( q \), a set of integers \( S \) and another integer \( m \not\in S + q \). Also fix two order-\( q \) groups \( \mathbb{G} \) and \( \mathbb{G}_T \), admitting a non-trivial, efficiently computable bilinear map \( e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T \).

The \( (S, m) \)-BDHE-Set problem with respect to \( \mathbb{G} \) and \( \mathbb{G}_T \) consists of the following experiment: Choose at random a scalar \( \hat{a} \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and a bit \( \sigma = 0 \). If \( \sigma = 0 \) then choose two random scalars \( z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q \), and if \( \sigma = 1 \) then choose a random scalar \( z_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and set \( z_2 \leftarrow \hat{a}/z_1 \mod q \). The BDHE-Set adversary gets as input \( \hat{a}^m = \hat{a}^i \cdot \hat{1} \) for all \( i \in S \) and also \( \hat{1}, \hat{2} \), and its goal is to guess the bit \( \sigma \). The advantage of an adversary \( A \) is defined as
\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T}^{S, m}(A, G_T) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[a, z_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q, z_2 \leftarrow \frac{a}{z_1}, A(\{\hat{a}^i : i \in S\}, \hat{1}, \hat{2}) \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[a, z_1, z_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q, A(\{\hat{a}^i : i \in S\}, \hat{1}, \hat{2}) \Rightarrow 1]
\]

Informally, the asymptotic Decision BDHE-Set assumption states that for any \( m \not\in S + S \) and a large enough prime \( q \), efficient adversaries (that work in time \( \text{poly}(|S|, \log q) \) only have insignificant advantage in the experiment from above.

Making this formal is rather straightforward (though getting the quantification right takes some care).

1This abuse of notation may take some getting used to: notice that the \( a \)’s themselves should be thought of as being “in the exponent.” In multiplicative notation, this power of \( \hat{a} \) would be denoted as something like \( g^{(a)} \).

2This assumption is called \( q \)-BDHI in [1], but we use the letter \( q \) as our group order.
Jumping ahead, for our system we use the assumption above with the target integer \( m = -1 \) and the set \( S \) defined as:

\[
S = [\left[ -2h - 2\ell, \ -2h - \ell - 2 \right] \cup \left[ -h - \ell, \ -\ell - 1 \right] \\
\cup \left[ 0, \ -\ell - 1 \right] \cup \left[ h + \ell, \ 2h + \ell \right] \cup \left[ 2h + 2\ell, \ 3h + 2\ell + 1 \right]
\]

where \( \ell \) is the depth of the identity-hierarchy of the system and \( h > \ell \) is some other parameter. (Specifically, if \( q^* \) is a bound on the number of queries then \( h = q^* + \ell + 2 \). It is easy to check that indeed \( m = -1 \notin S \cup S^c \).

The Linear Assumption. The decision linear assumption, first defined in [4], states (in our additive notations) that given the six source group elements \( \tilde{a}_i, \tilde{b}, \tilde{c}, d, \tilde{e}, f \), it is hard to distinguish the case where these elements are completely random from the case where they are chosen at random subject to the condition \( \tilde{f}/\tilde{c} = \tilde{e}/\tilde{b} + \tilde{d}/\tilde{a} \). (I.e., the discrete logarithm of \( f \) relative to \( c \) is the sum of the discrete logarithm of \( e \) relative to \( b \) and the discrete logarithm of \( d \) relative to \( a \).

V. A KEY-RANDOMIZABLE IBBE SYSTEM

Our system operates in prime-order bilinear-map groups. In the description below we assume that these order-\( q \) groups are fixed “once and for all” and everyone knows their description. (An alternative description will include the group-generation as part of the Setup procedure.) We also fix the hierarchy-depth of the system to some integer \( \ell \).

The identity space of the system is the scalar field \( \mathbb{Z}_q \), except that we have \( \ell \) “forbidden identities” within this range: \( \ell - 1 \) of them are arbitrary (and we set them to be \( 0, 1, \ldots, \ell - 2 \)), and the last one is a random scalar \( a \) that is chosen during Setup (see below).

Setup: Choose three random scalars \( a, b, s \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and a random invertible matrix \( A \in \mathbb{G}([\ell \times 7]) \), and set \( \mathcal{B} = (A^{-1})^t \). We note that the system only uses the top four rows of \( \mathcal{A} \) and five rows of \( \mathcal{B} \). The seventh dimension is only used in the security proof. Below we denote by \( \tilde{a}_i \), the vector \( \tilde{a}_i \overset{\text{def}}{=} [1, a, a^2, \ldots, a^{\ell-1}] \).

- The master secret key is \( SK = (\tilde{B}_1, \tilde{s}, \tilde{a}_\ell) \).

- The public key consists of three parts, \( PK = (PK_1, PK_2, PK_3) \), with \( PK_1 \) consisting of a target-group element that is used to compute the KEM key, \( PK_2 \) consisting of multiples of the rows of \( \mathcal{A} \) that are used to compute the ciphertext, and \( PK_3 \) consisting of multiples of the rows of \( \mathcal{B} \) that are used only for key randomization. Specifically we have

\[
PK_1 = a^{\ell-1} \tilde{s}, \quad PK_2 = \left\{ \{a^i \tilde{A}_1 : i = 0, \ldots, \ell\}, s\tilde{A}_2, \right. \\
\left. \left\{ \{a^i \tilde{A}_3 : i = 0, \ldots, \ell - 1\}, \tilde{A}_4 \right\} \right\}
\]

\[
PK_3 = \left\{ \{bs\tilde{B}_1, abs\tilde{B}_1, \tilde{B}_3, \tilde{B}_6\}, \right. \\
\left. \left\{ \{a^ib\tilde{B}_1 : i = 0, \ldots, \ell\}, \{a^ib^2\tilde{B}_2 : i = 0, \ldots, \ell\}, \right\} \right. \\
\left. \left\{ \{a^ib^3\tilde{B}_3 : i = 0, \ldots, \ell + 1\} \right\} \right\}
\]

KeyGen(\( PK, SK, ID \)): Choose a key of \( 3\ell - 3 \) seven-dimensional vectors of source-group elements as follows: Pick at random \( r_{i0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and set \( \tilde{K}_ID = (\tilde{u}_0, \tilde{V}_0, \tilde{W}_0, \tilde{X}_0, \tilde{y}_0) \), where \( \tilde{a}_0 = \tilde{u}/\tilde{a} - ID \), \( \tilde{y}_0 = r_{0} a^{\ell-1} \tilde{B}_3 + \text{span}(\tilde{B}_5, \tilde{b}) \),

\[
\tilde{V}_0 = r_{i0}(\tilde{a}_{\ell-2} \times \tilde{B}_1) = \{r_{0} a^{i} \tilde{B}_1 : i = 0, \ldots, \ell - 2\},
\]

\[
\tilde{W}_0 = a_{\ell-2} \times \tilde{B}_2 = \{a^i \tilde{B}_2 : i = 0, \ldots, \ell - 2\},
\]

\[
\tilde{X}_0 = r_{i0}(\tilde{a}_{\ell-2} \times \tilde{B}_3) = \{r_{0} a^{i} \tilde{B}_3 : i = 0, \ldots, \ell - 2\}.
\]

Note that the \( \tilde{W}_0 \) component is the same for all identities (so it really belongs in the public key). It is included in the secret key only for the purpose of the key-randomization procedure below.

KEM(\( PK, S, I \)): If \( |S| < \ell \) then add to \( S \) the first \( \ell - |S| \) of the “forbidden identities” \( 0, 1, \ldots \). Denote the resulting \( \ell \) identities by \( \{ID_1, ID_2, \ldots, ID_\ell\} \).

\[
- \text{Set the monic degree-}\ell \text{ polynomial } P(x) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} (x - ID_i), \text{ let } p_0, \ldots, p_\ell \text{ be the coefficients of } P \text{ and denote } \tilde{p} = [p_0, \ldots, p_\ell] \text{ (so } P(a) = \langle \tilde{p}, \tilde{a}\rangle). \]

\[
- \text{Choose at random } f_0, \ldots, f_{\ell-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q \text{ and denote } f \overset{\text{def}}{=} [f_0 f_1 \ldots f_{\ell-1}] \text{ and } F(x) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} f_i x^i. \text{ Make sure that } F(ID_i) \neq 0 \text{ for all } i = 1, \ldots, \ell \text{ (otherwise re-choose } F \text{ until this condition holds).} \]

\[
- \text{Choose a random scalar } t \in \mathbb{Z}_q. \]

\[
\tilde{c} = t (\tilde{P}(a) \tilde{A}_1 + s \tilde{A}_2 + F(a) \tilde{A}_3) + \text{span}(\tilde{A}_4) \quad (1)
\]

The implied KEM key is the target-group element \( \tilde{k} = t \cdot PK_1 = a^{\ell-1} \tilde{s} \).

Remark. Note that the ciphertext include seven source group elements and \( \ell \) scalars (to specify \( F \)). The ciphertext size can be reduced in a particular way, so that when encrypting to a set \( S \) of size \( m < \ell \) we only have \( m \) scalars in the ciphertext: Instead of choosing \( F \) completely at random, we impose the condition that \( F(ID) = 1 \) for each of the “forbidden identities” that were added to \( S \). This way, the encryptor can specify \( F \) using only the \( m \) scalars \( F(ID_i) \) for all \( ID_i \in S \). This optimization requires a small change to the proof of security, see remark at the end of Section VI. We also note that we can get a constant-size ciphertext by moving to the random-oracle model: the encryptor just sends some nonce, and \( F \) is determined by applying the random oracle to this nonce.

Decrypt(\( PK, (F, \tilde{c}), S, ID, \tilde{K}_ID \)), where \( ID \in S \). If \( |S| < \ell \) then add to \( S \) the first \( \ell - |S| \) of the “forbidden identities” \( 0, 1, \ldots \). Denote the resulting \( \ell \) identities by \( \{ID_1, ID_2, \ldots, ID_\ell\} \). Parse the key as \( \tilde{K}_ID = (\tilde{a}_0, \tilde{V}_0, \tilde{W}_0, \tilde{X}_0, \tilde{y}_0) \) and calculate the monic \( \ell \) degree polynomial \( P(x) = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} (x - ID_i) \), and do the following:

\[
- \text{Set } Q_{i0}(x) \overset{\text{def}}{=} P(x)/x - ID \text{ and } Q'_{i0}(x) = Q_{i0}(x) - a^{\ell-1}. \text{ (That is, } Q' \text{ is the polynomial } Q \text{ without the top coefficient of } 1 \cdot x^{\ell-1}. \text{ Denote the coefficient vector of } Q'_{i0} \text{ by } q_{i0} \).
\]
• Set $G_{i_0}(x) = \frac{F(x) - F(ID)}{x - ID}$ and denote the coefficient vector of $G_{i_0}$ by $\tilde{g}_{i_0} = [g_0, g_1 \ldots g_{t-2}]$.

• Set

$$\tilde{d}_{i_0} = \tilde{a}_{i_0} - \tilde{q}_{i_0} \cdot \tilde{W}_{i_0} - \tilde{g}_{i_0} \cdot (\tilde{V}_{i_0} - \tilde{q}_{i_0} \cdot \tilde{X}_{i_0} - \tilde{y}_{i_0}) / F(ID)$$

Finally, recover the KEM key as $\tilde{k} = \langle \tilde{c}, \tilde{d}_{i_0} \rangle$.

A. Correctness

For correctness, one can verify that we have

$$\tilde{d}_{i_0} = \frac{(s - r_{i_0} - r_{i_0}G_{i_0}(a) / F(ID)) \cdot \tilde{B}_1 - Q_{i_0}(a) - a^{t-1} \cdot \tilde{B}_2}{F(ID)}$$

Further developing the coefficient of $\tilde{B}_1$ (using $G_{i_0}(a) / (a - ID) = F(a) / (a - F(ID))$, we get

$$\frac{(s - r_{i_0} - r_{i_0}G_{i_0}(a) / F(ID))}{a - ID} = \frac{s \cdot F(ID) - r_{i_0} \cdot F(a)}{F(ID)(a - ID)}$$

Examining the inner-product of $\tilde{c}$ with $\tilde{d}_{i_0}$, we use the fact that $\langle \tilde{A}_i, \tilde{B}_j \rangle$ is either 0 (when $i \neq j$) or 1 (when $i = j$). Hence the span’s of $\tilde{A}_3$ and of $\tilde{B}_{5,6}$ drop out completely, and we are left with the product of the matching coefficients only:

$$\langle \tilde{c}, \tilde{d}_{i_0} \rangle = \left( \begin{array}{c} \text{coefficients of } \tilde{A}_1, \tilde{B}_1 \\ \text{coefficients of } \tilde{A}_3, \tilde{B}_3 \\ \text{coefficients of } \tilde{A}_2, \tilde{B}_2 \\ \text{coefficients of } \tilde{A}_1, \tilde{B}_1 \\ \end{array} \right) \cdot \tilde{1} = \tilde{k}.$$}

The first term in the parenthesis can be simplified using $Q_{i_0}(a) = P(a) / (a - ID)$. Further developing these terms yields

$$\langle \tilde{c}, \tilde{d}_{i_0} \rangle = t \cdot a^{t-1} \cdot s \cdot \tilde{1} = \tilde{k}.$$}

B. Key randomization

Our key-randomization follows Boyen’s idea from [8], where the key for identity-set $S = \{ID_1, \ldots, ID_m\}$ consists of $m$ “shifted versions” of the keys, $r_{i_0}' \hat{K}_{i_0}, r_{i_0}' \hat{K}_{i_0}, \ldots, r_{i_0}' \hat{K}_{i_0}$, such that $\sum r_{i_0}' = 1 \pmod q$. Namely, the augmented procedure KeyGen*$^+(PK, SK, SK)$ uses the same KeyGen procedure from above $m$ times to get $\hat{K}_{i_0} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(PK, SK, ID_i)$. Then for $i = 1 \ldots m$ it chooses $r_{i_0}' \in Z_q$ at random subject to the constraint $\sum r_{i_0}' = 1 \pmod q$, and outputs the secret key

$$\hat{K}_S = [r_{i_0}', \hat{K}_{i_0}, \ldots, r_{i_0}' \hat{K}_{i_0}]$$

where $r_{i_0}' \hat{K}_{i_0}$ means multiplying all the elements in $\hat{K}_{i_0}$ by the scalar $r_{i_0}'$. Below we call $\hat{K}_{i_0}$ the singleton key corresponding to $ID_i$, and $r_{i_0}' \hat{K}_{i_0}$ is the shifted singleton key for $ID_i$. Note that for the special case $m = 1$, we have $r_{i_0}' = 1$, so KeyGen*$^+$ degenerates to the original KeyGen.

Extended decryption. The extended decryption procedure Decrypt$^*$ is given a ciphertext $(F, \hat{c})$ together with a set of identities $S = \{ID_1, \ldots, ID_m\}$ ($m \leq \ell$) and a matching decryption key $\hat{K}_S$. It parses the decryption key as $\hat{K}_S = [\hat{K}_{i_0,1}, \ldots, \hat{K}_{i_0,m}]$ where the $\hat{K}_{i_0,j}$’s are shifted singleton keys. Namely we have $K_{ID_i} = r_{i_0} \hat{K}_{i_0,j}$ where the $\hat{K}_{i_0,j}$’s are singleton keys and $\sum r_{i_0,j} = 1 \pmod q$. Then we use each shifted singleton key to produces $\tilde{d}_{i_0}$ just as in Eq. (2), sets $\tilde{d}_S = \sum_i \tilde{d}_{i_0}$, and recover $\tilde{k} = \langle \tilde{c}, \tilde{d}_S \rangle$.

Correctness holds since the decryption process in linear: Denote by $\tilde{d}_{i_0}$ the vector that would have been obtained from the singleton key $\hat{K}_{i_0}$ using Eq. (2). Then on one hand decryption is linear so we have $\tilde{d}_{i_0}' = r_{i_0} \tilde{d}_{i_0}$. On the other hand by correctness of the basic decryption procedure we know that $\langle \tilde{c}, \tilde{d}_{i_0} \rangle = 1$. We therefore get

Key derivation. Key-derivation uses Boyen’s idea of reciprocal keys [8]. Namely, given the public key and any two identities $ID_1$ and $ID_2$, anyone can compute a pair of shifted singleton keys $\delta_{K_{ID_1}}, \delta_{K_{ID_2}}$ for the same (unknown) scalar factor $\delta$. The procedure for generating these reciprocal keys (which is used as a subroutine for key derivation) is as follows:

ReciprocalKeys$(PK, ID_1, ID_2)$: recall that the public key $PK$ depends on the unknown scalars $a, b, s$ (among other things).

• Choose at random $z \in Z_q$. The shifted singleton keys $\delta_{t_{K_{ID_1}}}$ will have $\delta = b(a - ID_1) / (a - ID_2)$.

• Choose at random $r_1, r_2 \in Z_q$ (which will play the role of $r_{i_0,1}$ and $r_{i_0,2}$ in the reciprocal keys).

• Compute $\delta_{t_{K_{ID_1}}}$ and $\delta_{t_{K_{ID_2}}}$ using $r_1, r_2$ and all the terms $a^b B_1, b s B_1, a^b s B_1, a^b t B_3, a^b t B_3, B_5, B_6$ (which are part of the $PK_3$ component of the public key).

From the description above it is clear that when $ID_1, ID_2 \neq a$, then ReciprocalKeys indeed returns the correct distribution, namely two shifted singleton keys $\delta_{t_{K_{ID_1}}}, \delta_{t_{K_{ID_2}}}$ where each $\hat{K}_{i_0}$ is drawn from the same distribution as the singleton keys for ID in KeyGen and $\delta$ is chosen at random in $Z_q$ (and independently of $\hat{K}_{i_0}$, $\hat{K}_{i_0}$).

KeyDerive$(PK, S, \hat{K}_S, S')$ (where $S' = \{ID_1, \ldots, ID_m\}$ and $S \subseteq S'$). Assume (w.l.o.g.) that $S$ consists of the first $n$ identities in $S'$, namely $S = \{ID_1, \ldots, ID_n\}$ with $n \leq m$. Denote $\hat{K}_S = \{\hat{K}_{i_0,1}, \ldots, \hat{K}_{i_0,n}\}$, where $\hat{K}_{i_0,n}$ is the shifted singleton key for $ID_1$ (consisting of $3\ell - 3$ 7-dimensional vectors of source-group elements).

For $i = 1, \ldots, m$, run the ReciprocalKeys procedure from above with identities $ID_i$ and $ID_{i+1}$ (indexing mod $m$) to get two shifted singleton keys for these ID’s, which we denote by $L_{ID_i}, M_{ID_{i+1}}$, respectively. Namely, set

$$(L_{ID_1}, M_{ID_{i+1}}) \leftarrow \text{ReciprocalKeys}(PK, ID_{i+1}, ID_{i+1})$$

Then for $i \in [1, n]$, set $L_{ID_i} = L_{ID_i} + L_{ID_i} - M_{ID_i}$, and for $i \in [n + 1, m]$ set $L_{ID_i} = \hat{L}_{ID_i} - M_{ID_i}$ (where addition and subtraction is element-wise). The new key is $\hat{K}_S = [\hat{K}_{i_0,1}, \ldots, \hat{K}_{i_0,n}]$. In Lemma 2 below we show that this KeyDerive procedure induces almost the same distribution as KeyGen over the decryption key $\hat{K}_S$. 
Lemma 2: For every \( S \subseteq S' \) (with \( |S'| = m \)) and every secret key \( K_S \) corresponding to \( S \), the procedure KeyDerivation\((PK, S, K_S, S')\) draws from a distribution at most \( O(m/q) \) away from that of KeyGen\((PK, SK, S')\).

\[ \text{AdvIBBE}^2 = \text{AdvBDHE}(G, G_T) + \text{AdvLinear}(G, G_T) \]

The proof is found in the long version [14].

REFERENCES


VI. SECURITY OF OUR SYSTEM

Theorem 2: The IBBE system from Section V is secure under the BDHE-Set assumption and the decision Linear assumption. Specifically, for an \( \ell \)-depth hierarchy, groups \( G, G_T \) of order \( q \), and an adversary that makes up to \( q^\ell \) key-extraction queries, we have \( \text{AdvIBBE}^2(\log q, \ell) \leq \text{AdvBDHE}(G, G_T) + \text{AdvLinear}(G, G_T) \), where the BDHE-Set instances are of size \( O(\ell + q^\ell) \).